





Department of Economics 









University of Munich 
Julian Wright 
† 









Abstract: This paper analyzes the consequences of multihoming on private and social incentives for 
compatibility. Multihoming occurs in our model when consumers buy from both of two competing firms 
so as to capture network benefits. We address whether the ability of consumers to multihome means 






© 2003 Toker Doganoglu and Julian Wright. 
* Center for Information and Network Economics, 
University of Munich. I would like to thank Volkswagen Stiftung for the generous financial 
support which made this research possible. 
† Contact Author. Department of Economics, 
National University of Singapore. jwright@nus.edu.sg. Views expressed herein are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Economics, National 
University of Singapore.       Multihoming and compatibility
Toker Doganoglu∗ and Julian Wright†
December 23, 2003
Abstract
This paper analyzes the consequences of multihoming on private and social incentives for
compatibility. Multihoming occurs in our model when consumers buy from both of two com-
peting ﬁrms so as to capture network beneﬁts. We address whether the ability of consumers to
multihome means policymakers do not need to worry about compatibility between ‘networks’.
1 Introduction
In an increasing number of situations, agents purchase two competing products in order to reap
maximal network beneﬁts. Consumers may purchase both Word Perfect and MS Word, employers
may advertise for employees on multiple job sites, websites may pay to list on competing search
engines, merchants may accept several types of credit cards, and ﬁrms may advertise their products
in two competing Yellow Pages. We call such behavior multihoming, following the use of this
terminology by Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003).1
Multihoming was common place in the early introduction of the telephone in the United States.
At the start of the 1900s, in many cities there were competing but not interconnected telephone
networks. In the absence of interconnection, users would require separate phone lines connecting
to each network so as to reach a wider number of people. According to a 1910 Bell survey of
Louisville, Kentucky the rate of multihoming was almost unity among large-scale enterprises while
being under ﬁfteen percent for neighborhood shops and residences (Mueller, 1989, pp. 255-61). In
contrast to this early period of network competition, the re-emergence of competing facilities based
networks in the last decade has been based on mandated interconnection.
This dichotomy, whereby interconnection is mandated in telecommunications while multihom-
ing is not challenged as the way to realize network beneﬁts for most other network goods raises the
∗Center for Information and Network Economics, University of Munich. I would like to thank Volkswagen
Stiftung for the generous ﬁnancial support which made this research possible.
†Contact Author. Department of Economics, National University of Singapore. jwright@nus.edu.sg
1Multihoming was originally an Internet term, referring to when a host has more than one connection to the
Internet. For instance, multihoming captures the technique of connecting a host to the Internet via two or more
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to maintain network connectivity even if once connection fails. Multihoming has
been analyzed in this context by Cr´ emer et al. (2000).
1question: Does the ability of consumers to multihome mean policymakers need not be concerned
about a possible “compatibility problem,” in which ﬁrms do not make their networks compatible
even though doing so is socially desirable? In this paper we use some simple models to illustrate
that even if consumers can (and do) multihome, the policymaker cannot ignore the issue of net-
work compatibility. In fact, for the cases we look at, the possibility of multihoming makes the
compatibility problem more likely to arise.
Surprisingly, the existing literature on compatibility and standards remains largely silent on
the issue. The literature, starting with Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1985),
almost uniformly assumes consumers can purchase only one of the competing products (e.g. VHS
versus BETA) and that there are homogenous network beneﬁts across consumers. An exception
is De Palma et al. (1999) who show that double purchases “drastically aﬀect the nature of the
product market equilibrium as well as compatibility choices made by the ﬁrms” (p. 209). Theirs
is a model of quantity competition between two ﬁrms in which consumers are heterogenous with
respect to network beneﬁts. The model implies, in the absence of multihoming, ﬁrms will always
diﬀerentiate their product vertically by oﬀering networks of diﬀerent sizes. The possibility of
multihoming eliminates this vertical diﬀerentiation, implying there is a continuum of symmetric
equilibria. On the other hand, if ﬁrms choose to be fully compatible, multihoming is eliminated and
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium (with partial compatibility, an asymmetric equilibrium
emerges). Despite the complex picture they obtain, they are able to conclude that in the presence
of multihoming there is an excessive tendency for ﬁrms to become compatible, and that welfare is
maximized by imposing complete incompatibility, relying instead on multihoming.2
In this paper we start by considering a simple price setting model of two diﬀerentiated ﬁrms
that compete in the presence of multihoming. We assume there are two types of consumers who
have diﬀerent valuations on network beneﬁts. When there is no compatibility, parameter values
are assumed so that high types multihome while low types do not. For example, in the case
of telecommunications, the high types could represent business users while the low types could
represent residential users.
The most obvious eﬀect of multihoming in the model is to reduce the competitive pressure on
ﬁrms. Firms do not compete for multihoming consumers who purchase from both of the competi-
tors. The higher installed base of customers gives rise to higher prices. Firms also beneﬁt through
increased sales, as some consumers purchase twice. The model highlights some key tradeoﬀs in
relying on multihoming as opposed to compatibility in achieving network beneﬁts. Multihoming
involves a duplication of costs due to double purchase. In some cases (for example, searching on
multiple search engines), the costs of handling additional customers is small compared to the costs
of achieving compatibility (having all search engines share the same database of information) in
which case multihoming may be a desirable way to capture network beneﬁts. On the other hand,
2An early paper to consider multihoming in a network context is Church and King (1993), who consider the
equilibrium versus socially optimal level of learning of a second language.
2multihoming also aﬀects the way ﬁrms compete, generally relaxing price competition, and resulting
in excessive incentives for them to avoid compatibility.
The model is used to address the private and social incentives for compatibility. Consistent
with De Palma et al., the possibility of multihoming tends to reverse the normal private and social
incentives for compatibility. However, in contrast to their results, our model is one in which without
the possibility of multihoming, ﬁrms have excessive incentives to make their products compatible
as compatibility reduces competition. Multihoming generally reverses this result — ﬁrms are more
likely to have excessive incentives to keep their services incompatible under multihoming.
Widespread multihoming may give policymakers the impression that there is no need to man-
date compatibility, since consumers will already capture network beneﬁts through their decision
to subscribe to multiple networks. The model suggests it is exactly this situation in which the
beneﬁts of mandating compatibility may be greatest. In the presence of multihoming, ﬁrms will
avoid compatibility even when it enhances overall welfare. Compatibility will cause consumers to
stop multihoming, which is bad for ﬁrms since with multihoming ﬁrms will face less competitive
pressure.
We generalize our results to a two-sided market setting. Two-sided markets involve two distinct
types of users, each of whom values the number of users of the other type, and platform(s) that
sell to both types of users. As Evans (2002, p42) notes “Most two-sided markets we observe in
the real world appear to have several competing two-sided ﬁrms and at least one side appears to
multihome.” For instance, employers that value job seekers may advertise on multiple job websites
and job seekers that value the number of employers listing ads may search on multiple job websites.
Game developers that value consumers with game consoles may write software for competing game
platforms (Xbox and PlayStation) and consumers that value being able to use diﬀerent game
software may buy competing game consoles. Other applications in which multihoming is likely
to be important include matching services, payment cards, search engines, shopping malls, and
directories such as Yellow Pages.3 We show that not only are our results robust to moving to a
two-sided market framework, but in fact, if anything, they are strengthened.
Finally, we return to the simpler case of a one-sided market but consider a version of our model
in which there are pure network eﬀects. We consider two sets of beliefs. Under beliefs which
stubbornly favor one ﬁrm over another (say the incumbent over the entrant), all consumers will
coordinate on the incumbent, which will allow the incumbent to maintain positive proﬁts and 100%
market share. If the social planner prefers lower prices, it may favor a solution with compatibility,
but the dominant ﬁrm will not sponsor any such move. Any option for consumers to multihome
will not aﬀect this outcome, since with such beliefs, consumers will continue to coordinate on the
dominant ﬁrm. In this case, the ability of consumers to multihome does not solve (or change) the
3Armstrong (2002) considers models of two-sided markets in which all consumers of one type multihome and all
consumers of the other type do not. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) analyze two-sided
market structures allowing consumers to multihome. None of these papers considers the implications of multihoming
on the optimality of network compatibility.
3compatibility problem.
We then consider a set of beliefs in which multihoming can arise in equilibrium. Without
the possibility of multihoming, the beliefs give rise to normal Bertrand competition with prices
competed down to cost and all consumers subscribing to a single ﬁrm. This is the ﬁrst-best outcome,
and so imposing compatibility is never desirable. When consumers can multihome, the ﬁrms share
the market even though they make zero proﬁts. Since such multihoming is ineﬃcient relative to all
consumers subscribing to a single ﬁrm, it implies there may be a social (but not a private) incentive
to make networks compatible. In this case, the ability of consumers to multihome introduces a
potential compatibility problem.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model in which consumers
can purchase from one or both of two symmetric ﬁrms. The model is used to compare the case
with and without multihoming and with and without compatibility. Section 3 extends the model
to study two-sided markets with multihoming, while Section 4 considers a version of the model
with pure network beneﬁts. Section 5 oﬀers some brief concluding thoughts.
2 Hotelling model of multihoming
We start with a standard Hotelling model of competition with network eﬀects. There are two
symmetric ﬁrms denoted 1 and 2. Consumers can subscribe to a service from either ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2,
or both ﬁrms if this is possible (multihoming). Subscribing to a service gives consumers network
beneﬁts that are linear in the number of other agents that the consumer can access through the
service. Consumers get beneﬁts bn of subscribing to a service which allows them to ‘reach’ n
other consumers. With probability λ the parameter b is equal to bH and consumers value the
network beneﬁts highly (high types), and with probability 1−λ the parameter b is equal to bL ≥ 0
and consumers do not value the network beneﬁts highly (low types). It is assumed bH > bL
and 0 < λ < 1. The average value of the network beneﬁts parameter b is denoted β, where
β = λbH + (1 − λ)bL.
Consumers also obtain intrinsic beneﬁts of v0 from subscription from a single ﬁrm. Throughout
this section (and the next) we assume that v0 is suﬃciently high so that all consumers will want
to subscribe to at least one ﬁrm. Since we assume multihoming only arises because of network
beneﬁts, we assume that these intrinsic beneﬁts are not duplicated when consumers subscribe to
two competing services. Having a phone line connected to each of two separate networks may
provide some additional intrinsic beneﬁts to users but the predominant beneﬁt arises from being
able to reach the additional people on the second network.4
4We have worked through the model in this section allowing for (partial) duplication of intrinsic beneﬁts, so that
the beneﬁt is 2kv0 for 1/2 ≤ k ≤ 1. With duplication of intrinsic beneﬁts, consumers have an additional reason
to multihome that does not depend on network beneﬁts. Provided v0 is such that consumers will not want to
multihome purely to get the duplication of intrinsic beneﬁts, this does not change results except that welfare under
multihoming has an additional term λ(2k − 1)v0.
4Firms also diﬀer in the normal Hotelling way, so they are located at either end of a unit interval,
and consumers are located uniformly along the unit interval (there is a measure 1 of consumers).
Consumers face transportation costs tx of travelling a distance x to the ﬁrm(s) they purchase from.
The transportation costs for a consumer located at x to travel to a ﬁrm i can be summarized by
the function Ti(x) = tx(2 − i) + t(1 − x)(i − 1) where i = 1 corresponds to ﬁrm 1 and i = 2
corresponds to ﬁrm 2. The measure of high types that subscribe to ﬁrm i is denoted si and the
measure of low types that subscribe to ﬁrm i is denoted ni.
Consumers value popular ﬁrms, but popularity is only determined after consumers make their
subscription decisions. Thus, consumers have to form expectations about how other consumers
will behave in order to evaluate the value they will receive from each provider. We assume ratio-
nal beliefs (expectations), which means that each consumer correctly works out the size of each
provider. Where there are multiple rational beliefs for given prices (the case in Section 4), we will
further reﬁne the nature of these beliefs.
In summary, the net utility of a consumer of type b located at x ∈ [0,1] when she purchases
from ﬁrm i is given by
Ui(x,b,Ni) = v0 − pi − Ti (x) + bNi
for i = 1,2, where Ni represents the total number of consumers that can be ‘reached’ by subscribing
to ﬁrm i, and pi is the (uniform) subscription price of ﬁrm i. When the same consumer multihomes,
subscribing to both ﬁrms, the net utility she gets is
U(x,b,N) = v0 − p1 − p2 − T1 (x) − T2 (x) + bN,
where N represents the total number of consumers that can be reached by subscribing to both
ﬁrms. Given N = 1 (multihoming ensures all consumers can be reached) and T1 (x) + T2 (x) = t
(the total distance of travelling to both ﬁrms is always unity), this simpliﬁes to
U(x,b,N) = v0 − p1 − p2 − t + b.
Assume it costs each ﬁrm f to provide the service to each customer.
To determine the incentives for compatibility, three cases need to be distinguished. The case
in which networks are incompatible and multihoming is not possible is considered ﬁrst (this is the
benchmark case). Then multihoming is introduced in Section 2.2, and ﬁnally the networks are
made compatible in Section 2.3. A comparison of the cases is given in Section 2.4.
2.1 Incompatible ﬁrms without multihoming
Since there are λ high types, a share s1 of which are subscribed to ﬁrm 1, and there are 1 − λ low
types, a share n1 of which are subscribed to ﬁrm 1, the total number of consumers that can be
reached by subscribing to ﬁrm 1 is N1 = λs1 + (1 − λ)n1. Likewise N2 = λs2 + (1 − λ)n2. Then a
consumer located at x gets utility
U1(x,b,N1) = v0 − p1 − tx + b(λs1 + (1 − λ)n1)
5if they subscribe to ﬁrm 1 and utility
U2(x,b,N2) = v0 − p2 − t(1 − x) + b(λ(1 − s1) + (1 − λ)(1 − n1))
if they subscribe to ﬁrm 2. Assuming consumers are not able to multihome, the number of con-
sumers joining each ﬁrm can be found by equating U1 and U2 to ﬁnd the high-value consumer and
the low-value consumer that is indiﬀerent between purchasing from each ﬁrm. This implies s1 and
n1 are deﬁned by the simultaneous solution to
U1(s1,bH,N1) = U2(s1,bH,N2)
U1(n1,bL,N1) = U2(n1,bL,N2).



















with s2 = 1 − s1 and n2 = 1 − n1. Recall that β = λbH + (1 − λ)bL is the average value of the
network beneﬁts parameter b. Using the share functions above, the measure of consumers on ﬁrm








and, given that market is covered, N2 = 1 − N1. To avoid the possibility of cornered market
equilibrium, we will adopt the standard assumption that the transportation cost parameter is
greater than the relevant network beneﬁts parameter; that is,
t > β. (1)
Since bH > bL this also implies t > bL > (1 − λ)bL, a property we use repeatedly in this section.
Note market shares are more sensitive to prices than for a normal Hotelling model due to the
network beneﬁts that arise from attracting additional consumers.
Firm i obtains proﬁts of
πi = (pi − f)Ni.
Substituting the function Ni into proﬁts for i = 1,2, taking the ﬁrst order conditions, and solving




2 = f + t − β.
These are the same prices that would arise in a model in which all consumers have network beneﬁts
parameter equal to β. Equilibrium prices involve the usual Hotelling markup over cost but are
reduced to the extent of the network beneﬁts. Absent compatibility, ﬁrms compete more aggres-
sively to capture the network beneﬁts with their own network of subscribers. The corresponding








6which is positive given (1).
Aggregate welfare is deﬁned as the weighted sum of the consumers’ and the ﬁrms’ surplus. Since
unit demands are assumed, the possibility that higher prices lower welfare is captured by allowing
the ﬁrms’ surplus to be discounted relative to consumer surplus. Let the weight on producer
surplus in ‘aggregate welfare’ be α where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Equilibrium welfare without multihoming is
then
W∗















The ﬁrst two terms are the intrinsic and network beneﬁts when there is no compatibility and
no multihoming. The third and fourth terms represent the costs of providing the service and
consumers’ average transportation costs. In addition, to the extent the ﬁrms’ surplus is discounted,
welfare is lower the higher are the ﬁrms’ margins. Firms earn high margins if their products are
more diﬀerentiated (transport costs are high) and low margins if network eﬀects are strong (in
which case ﬁrms will compete aggressively in an attempt to capture the whole market). Since
there are two ﬁrms, their equilibrium proﬁts are multiplied by two.
2.2 Incompatible ﬁrms with multihoming
Compared to the case above, consumers in this section are assumed to be able to multihome
(subscribe to both ﬁrms). We can immediately rule out two extreme cases. There are no equilibria
in which all consumers multihome, since then facing positive prices each individual consumer has
no reason to multihome. Also we are not interested in parameter values for which no consumers
would choose to multihome in equilibrium, since then allowing consumers to multihome would not
change results. Instead, we assume all low types singlehome (subscribe to one ﬁrm only) and all
high types multihome. Later we will impose conditions on parameters to make sure this is optimal.
Formally, this implies si = 1 and Ni = λ + (1 − λ)ni for i = 1,2.
Subscribing to ﬁrm i allows a consumer to reach all high types and a share ni of low types. As
a result, a consumer located at x receives indirect utility of
U1(x,b,N1) = v0 − p1 − tx + b(λ + (1 − λ)n1)
if they subscribe exclusively to ﬁrm 1,
U2(x,b,N2) = v0 − p2 − t(1 − x) + b(λ + (1 − λ)(1 − n1))
if they subscribe exclusively to ﬁrm 2, and
U(x,b,N) = v0 − p1 − p2 − t + b
if they subscribe to both ﬁrms.
The proportion of singlehoming consumers that join ﬁrm 1 is then found by solving
U1(n1,bL,N1) = U2(n1,bL,N2)






2(t − (1 − λ)bL)
and n2 = 1 − n1. The assumption in (1) is suﬃcient to ensure the market share equation is well
behaved.
The proﬁts of network i are
πi = (pi − f)(λ + (1 − λ)ni).
At the margin, the ﬁrms do not compete for the fraction λ of consumers that multihome, but they
compete for the remaining 1 − λ consumers that singlehome. Substituting the share function into
proﬁts for i = 1,2, taking the ﬁrst order conditions, solving out for prices, and simplifying implies




2 = f +
1 + λ
1 − λ
(t − (1 − λ)bL). (2)





2t(t − (1 − λ)bL)c − (t − (1 − λ)bL)(2t + λbL)

λ (1 − λ)bL
+ bH − t
with c = 2t(t − (1 − λ)bL) − λ(1 − λ) bLbH, and deﬁne P ≡ {λ,bL,bH,f,t | bH > bL,bH >
2t/(1 − λ),t−λbH −(1−λ)bL > 0,f ≥ 0,f0 > 0,f ≤ f0} which will be empty for some parameter
values.
Proposition 1 The prices given in (2) constitute a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, whenever the
parameter values are such that P is non-empty.
Proof. See appendix.
It turns out that the main constraint for the existence of the equilibrium that we are considering
is that the costs of providing for each consumer are not too high (f < f0). Higher values of the
per-customer cost imply higher levels of the candidate equilibrium prices. In this case, given that
ﬁrm 2 charges the candidate equilibrium price, ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to lower its price to a level
where some of the high types stop subscribing to ﬁrm 2. This has a positive impact on the demand
of ﬁrm 1 from the low types due to network eﬀects. Thus, whenever λ is suﬃciently small, a price
cut inducing some high types to stop multihoming increases the demand from low types enough
that ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate.
In setting its price, each ﬁrm trades oﬀ the beneﬁts of a higher price on its installed base of
customers with a lower market share of singlehoming consumers. The existence of singlehoming
consumers disciplines the prices that networks can charge, forcing them to take into account the
usual competitive pressures on at least a portion of their customers. The market share of low types
is still more sensitive to price than in a normal Hotelling framework because of the network beneﬁts
8that arise from attracting additional low types (assuming bL > 0). However, the market share of
low types is less sensitive to price than was the case without multihoming. This reﬂects the fact
that with multihoming, high types can be reached regardless of which ﬁrm low types subscribe to,
reducing the impact of network eﬀects on the ﬁrms’ pricing behavior. Moreover, the number of
high types attracted does not depend on prices at the margin. We therefore expect higher prices
under multihoming.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price is higher when consumers are able to multihome compared
to when they are not.














(t − (1 − λ)bL) + λbH
> 0.











which is positive given (1). Firms earn higher proﬁts when more consumers multihome, both
through higher prices and through greater demand compared to the case without multihoming.
This also implies
Proposition 3 Equilibrium proﬁts are higher when consumers are able to multihome compared to
when they are not.

































Equilibrium welfare under multihoming is then
W∗
M = v0 + λbH +
 
1 − λ2 bL
2
− (1 + λ)f − (1 + 3λ)
t
4










The ﬁrst three terms measure the intrinsic and network beneﬁts. The network beneﬁts obtained
by low types are now higher than without multihoming, reﬂecting the ability of low types to reach
9high types who multihome.5 The fourth and ﬁfth terms represent the costs of providing the service
and consumers’ average transportation costs. Note the costs of providing the service includes some
duplication of subscription costs to the extent there is multihoming (so costs equal 2f a fraction
λ of the time, and equal f a fraction 1 − λ of the time). Similarly, transportation costs equal t a
fraction λ of the time and equal t/4 a fraction 1 − λ of the time. In addition, to the extent the
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are discounted relative to consumer surplus (α < 1), multihoming lowers welfare by
raising prices and transferring surplus to ﬁrms. This is reﬂected in the last term.
2.3 Compatible ﬁrms
When the networks are made compatible (which is assumed to cost each ﬁrm a ﬁxed amount F),
all consumers will be able to connect with each other, so that Ni = 1. In this case a consumer
located at x gets beneﬁts of
U1 (x,b,N1) = v0 − p1 − tx + b
if they subscribe exclusively to ﬁrm 1,
U2 (x,b,N2) = v0 − p2 − t(1 − x) + b
if they subscribe exclusively to ﬁrm 2, and
U (x,b,N) = v0 − p1 − p2 − t + b
if they subscribe to both ﬁrms.
Compatibility implies consumers do not get any extra network beneﬁts from multihoming.
Since no consumers will want to incur subscription fees and transportation costs twice if there
are no additional network beneﬁts, proﬁts are just those obtained when all consumers choose to
singlehome. That is,
πi = (pi − f)(λsi + (1 − λ)ni) − F
where






and n2 = s2 = 1 − n1. Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions, the corresponding equilibrium prices are




2 = f + t.






5The network beneﬁts obtained by the 1 − λ low types are equal to bL a fraction λ of the time (since they can
reach all high types) and are equal to bL/2 a fraction 1 − λ of the time (since they can only reach the low types




10and equilibrium welfare is
W∗
C = v0 + β − f −
t
4







In this case welfare includes the maximal amount of network surplus (all λ high types get bH and
all 1 − λ low types get bL). Relative to the no-compatibility and no-multihoming case, network
beneﬁts are doubled but welfare is lowered by the ﬁxed costs of achieving compatibility and by
higher consumer prices (in the case that consumer surplus is valued more highly than producer
surplus).
2.4 Private versus social compatibility decisions
Before considering the case with multihoming, consider ﬁrst the conventional case in which mul-
tihoming is not considered. This provides the benchmark for an analysis of multihoming in this
model. The Hotelling-type price competition model we have chosen is one in which this benchmark
implies too much compatibility.6
To see this, note that given the symmetry between the ﬁrms, the ﬁrms’ unilateral and joint
incentives to make their services compatible are identical. Firms will make their services compatible
only if there is an increase in equilibrium proﬁts; that is, if π∗
C is higher than π∗




This condition trades oﬀ the higher margins to a ﬁrm resulting from compatibility (under compati-
bility, ﬁrms no longer compete to capture network eﬀects) with the costs of reaching compatibility.
Comparing W∗
N and W∗








Firms will have too much incentive to make their services compatible. A social planner considers
the increase in prices resulting from compatibility at best as a transfer from consumers to ﬁrms.
We measure this excessive tendency towards compatibility, which we denote E, as the diﬀerence
between the critical level of ﬁxed costs of achieving compatibility at which ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
between compatibility and incompatibility (FΠ) and the critical level of ﬁxed costs of achieving
compatibility at which the social planner is indiﬀerent between compatibility and incompatibil-
ity (FW). If this diﬀerence is positive (negative), then there is an excessive tendency towards
compatibility (incompatibility).
Proposition 4 There will be an excessive tendency towards compatibility absent multihoming.
6This contrasts to the earlier results of Katz and Shapiro (1985) in which quantity setting ﬁrms may have
insuﬃcient incentives to make their products compatible since they cannot capture the full surplus from doing
so. Our benchmark case is consistent with existing models of price setting ﬁrms, such as the results surveyed in
Shy (2001). This provides a conservative approach given we will show multihoming makes it more likely that a
“compatibility problem” will emerge.
11Proof. The excessive tendency towards compatibility absent multihoming, measured as EN =
FΠ
N − FW
N , equals (β/2) − (β/2 − β/4α) from (3) and (4). Therefore EN = β/4α > 0.
The positive value of EN captures the fact that there are times when ﬁrms prefer to make their
services compatible even though the social planner does not (the reverse is not true).
When multihoming is possible, the incentives for compatibility become more complex. Multi-
homing reduces eﬀective competition and raises aggregate sales (ﬁrms still share the market but
the market size is now increased by some consumers who subscribe to both ﬁrms), both of which
increase the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Compatibility removes the reason for consumers to multihome (which
is to capture network beneﬁts). Given that proﬁts are increased by allowing multihoming, it is
not surprising that ﬁrms are now less inclined to make their services compatible. What is more
surprising is that multihoming now generally reverses the bias in the model towards excessive
compatibility.








Clearly if bL = 0, so that low types get no network beneﬁts, then the ﬁrms will never make their
networks compatible when consumers can multihome, no matter how small the costs of achieving
compatibility are. In this case, multihoming eliminates all network eﬀects, thereby leading to
higher prices given the installed base of high types.
Comparing W∗
M with W∗











(t − (1 − λ)bL) − t
!
> 2αF. (6)
Compared to the case without multihoming, there are a number of new eﬀects. Incompatibility
now implies duplicated costs of customers subscribing to both ﬁrms (the term λf) and added
transportation costs as customers ‘travel’ to both ﬁrms (the term 3λt/4), neither of which aﬀect
the ﬁrms’ compatibility decision. On the other hand, the loss in network beneﬁts due to incom-
patibility are now less than before since consumers anyway capture some of these beneﬁts through
multihoming. Where the ﬁrms’ surplus is weighted less than consumer surplus, compatibility also
leads to an increase in welfare to the extent prices are higher under the multihoming equilibrium.
With a much reduced private incentive for compatibility and a generally increased social in-
centive for compatibility, for a range of parameter values there will be an excessive tendency
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12which may be negative (for example, it is negative when bL = 0). More generally, we can compare
the excessive tendency towards compatibility with and without the possibility of multihoming. We
ﬁnd that
Proposition 5 The excessive tendency of ﬁrms to choose compatibility is decreased by the possi-
bility of multihoming.
Proof. Deﬁne ∆ to be the diﬀerence between the excessive tendency towards compatibility
with multihoming and that without multihoming. Then








Somewhat paradoxically, the ability of consumers to multihome means policymakers may need
to be more concerned about compatibility than otherwise would be the case. This is more likely to
be the case when (i) there are more high-value (multihoming) consumers; (ii) when network beneﬁts
are lower for low-value consumers; (iii) when transportation costs are higher; and (iv) when the
cost of providing the service to each user is higher. This suggests policymakers may have a reason
to be concerned about ﬁrms which do not make their networks compatible in situations in which
some consumers choose to multihome, where this multihoming involves signiﬁcant duplication of
costs, where this multihoming occurs through consumers subscribing to a second ﬁrm’s service that
is “distant” from their preferred choice, and where some consumers put little value on network
beneﬁts.
3 Multihoming in two-sided markets
As noted in the introduction, many of the applications where multihoming arises involve two-sided
markets. The point of this section is to show how the results from one-sided markets change in
moving to a two-sided markets context. It shows the analysis of compatibility in one-sided markets
carries over to two-sided markets.
The model diﬀers from the model in Section 2 in that users of the network service can be
distinguished by the side of the market they belong to. We distinguish agents by the group they
belong to — either A or B. Suppose there is measure 1 of agents from group A and likewise for
group B. Consistent with the standard assumption of two-sided markets, it is assumed each group
values the number of agents belonging to the other group, but not the number of agents within the
same group. In particular, agents get beneﬁts bn of subscribing to a service which allows them to
access n agents from the other group. Suppose a measure λj agents from group j are high types
(in which case b = bH) and a measure 1 − λj of agents from group j are low types (in which case
13b = bL). Without loss of generality, assume λA ≥ λB and bH > bL so that agents from group A are
more likely (or equally likely) to be high types (and so multihome) compared to agents from group
B. We deﬁne the average values of the network beneﬁt parameter b as βA = λAbH + (1 − λA)bL
for group A and βB = λBbH + (1 − λB)bL for group B, so that βA ≥ βB.
To compare results with those of an equivalent one-sided market, we assume λ = (λA + λB)/2
so that β = (βA + βB)/2 in the equivalent one-sided market. We maintain assumption (1), which
with this assumption implies t > (βA + βB)/2. The measure of high types from group j that
subscribe to ﬁrm i is denoted sij and the measure of low types from group j that subscribe to ﬁrm
i is denoted nij.
The net utility of an agent with network beneﬁts parameter b from group j located at x ∈ [0,1]
when she purchases from ﬁrm i is given by
Uij (x,b,Nik) = v0 − pij − Ti (x) + bNik,
for i = 1,2 and j = A,B, where Nik represents the total number of agents from group k = A,B 6= j
that can be reached by subscribing to ﬁrm i, and pij is the subscription price set by ﬁrm i for
group j.7 When the same agent multihomes, subscribing to both ﬁrms, the net utility she gets can
be written as
Uj(x,b,Nk) = v0 − p1j − p2j − t + b,
for j = A,B. Assume it costs each ﬁrm f to provide the service to each customer.
As before, three cases can be distinguished. The case with compatible networks is the standard
case of Hotelling competition, so the only diﬀerence from the case of a one-sided market is that






The same type of result also holds for the case in which networks are incompatible but mul-
tihoming is not possible. The equilibrium prices in this case are equivalent to those found in
Armstrong (2002) who analyzes a Hotelling model of a two-sided market in which users are not
allowed to multihome and in which each group has homogenous network beneﬁts. In our model
this homogenous network beneﬁt is simply replaced by the weighted average of high and low types’








2B = f + t − βA.



















7Consistent with the literature on two-sided markets, ﬁrms are assumed to be able to set diﬀerent prices to the
two diﬀerent groups.
8This assumes it costs each ﬁrm F to make its network compatible with its rival’s network for each group A and
B.























which is also exactly twice that of an equivalent one-sided market, reﬂecting that there are twice





From these results it is clear that the incentive for ﬁrms to make their services compatible in
the absence of multihoming remains unchanged by the move to a two-sided market setting. When
there is no multihoming allowed, any asymmetry in the proportion of high types across groups does
not translate into an asymmetry in the degree of multihoming across groups, and so does not aﬀect
average results. The underlying symmetry in ﬁrms together with the linearity of equilibrium prices,
ensures that results are identical to those for an equivalent one-sided market. From proposition 4,
it follows that there will be an excessive tendency towards compatibility absent multihoming.
The third case to consider is that in which multihoming is possible. As in Section 2.2, we
consider only the case in which all high types multihome and all low types singlehome. This
implies sij = 1 and Nij = λj + (1 − λj)nij for i = 1,2 and j = A,B. As a result, the proportion
of low types that join ﬁrm 1 is found by solving
U1A (n1A,bL,N1B) = U2A (n1A,bL,N2B)
U1B (n1B,bL,N1A) = U2B (n1B,bL,N2A).





t(p2A − p1A) + (1 − λB)bL (p2B − p1B)






t(p2B − p1B) + (1 − λA)bL (p2A − p1A)
2(t2 − (1 − λA)(1 − λB)b2
L)
,
where n2A = 1 − n1A and n2B = 1 − n1B. Since (1) implies t2 > βAβB, it follows t2 >
(1 − λA)(1 − λB)b2
L and the market share equations are well behaved.
Firm i obtains proﬁts of
πi = (piA − f)(λA + (1 − λA)niA) + (piB − f)(λB + (1 − λB)niB).
Substituting the share functions into the proﬁt function for i = 1,2, and simultaneously solving




2A = f +
1 + λA
1 − λA




2B = f +
1 + λB
1 − λB
t − (1 + λA)bL.
As in section 2, there will be some parameter restrictions required for this equilibrium to exist.
We assume these restrictions hold, and discuss the properties of this equilibrium below.10
9If λA > λB, the price charged to group A will be higher than that charged to group B, reﬂecting the asymmetry
in cross-user externalities.
10In particular, we require that all high types prefer to multihome and all low types prefer to singlehome. The











A (1 − λB) + λ2
B (1 − λA) + 3(λA + λB) − 6λAλB
















(1 − λ)(1 − λA)(1 − λB)
δ2, (7)
where δ = (λA − λB)/2 and λ = (λA + λB)/2. With the same proportion of high types in group
A and group B, proﬁts are exactly twice those in the case of a one-sided market (π∗∗
M = 2π∗
M). In
this case, the private incentives for compatibility remain unchanged in a two-sided market.
In the asymmetric case in which λA > λB, proﬁts in an asymmetric two-sided market are
higher than twice those of an equivalent one-sided market. This reﬂects that equilibrium prices





M, ﬁrms have an even stronger incentive not to make their networks
compatible when agents can multihome in an asymmetric two-sided market.
Equilibrium welfare after simplifying terms is
W∗∗
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4(1 − λA)(1 − λB)
t
















(1 − λ)(1 − λA)(1 − λB)
!!
δ2. (8)















Proposition 6 When the two sides of the market are symmetric, the private and social incentives
for compatibility are identical to those for an equivalent one-sided market.
When the two sides of the market involve an asymmetry (λA > λB), welfare is higher due
to higher network beneﬁts, but lower to the extent that the social planner discounts proﬁts. To
understand why this is, consider what would happen if everyone on one side of the two-sided
market multihomes and everyone on the other side singlehomes. Then network beneﬁts will be
maximized, since each user can reach all others. Thus, there will be greater network beneﬁts from
multihoming than those that would arise for an equivalent one-sided market where half of the users
multihome. However, if consumer surplus is weighted more than proﬁts, the higher prices that arise
former is ensured if bH > 2(f + 2t/(1 − λB) − (1 + λA)bL)/(1 − λA), while the latter condition holds given t > bL.
However, one also needs parameter conditions to ensure neither ﬁrm wants to lower its price (non-inﬁnitesimally) to
one group in order to convince high types from that group to stop multihoming, which would boost demand from
the low types from the other group.
16from multihoming when there is an asymmetry in the number of agents across the two sides of
the market can oﬀset this positive eﬀect on welfare. When these various eﬀects are combined, we
obtain:
Proposition 7 The ability of agents to multihome decreases the excessive tendency of ﬁrms to
choose compatibility more in an asymmetric two-sided market compared to an equivalent one-sided
market.
Proof. Without multihoming, the excessive tendency towards compatibility in a two-sided
market is simply twice that of the equivalent one-sided market case. In terms of our notation, this
implies E∗∗
N = 2E∗
N. The diﬀerence in the excessive tendency of ﬁrms to choose compatibility in
a two-sided market with multihoming compared to without multihoming is E∗∗
M − E∗∗
N . Compar-
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− 1
!
(1 + 2(1 − α))δ2bL
= −
4(1 + 2(1 − α))δ2bL
(1 − λ)(1 − λA)(1 − λB)
< 0.
Thus, not only are our results robust to moving to a two-sided market framework, but in fact,
if anything, they are strengthened. The “compatibility problem” that can arise because agents can
multihome is more likely to emerge in a two-sided market setting.
4 Pure network beneﬁts
So far our results have been derived in situations where ﬁrms share the market symmetrically. The
incentives for compatibility can be quite diﬀerent in the case that one ﬁrm dominates the market.
This section explores such asymmetric outcomes that can arise in the context of pure network
eﬀects.
Suppose transportation costs and intrinsic beneﬁts are set to zero in our model of Section 2,
so that we have the case of pure network beneﬁts in a one-sided market. Utilities for consumers
purchasing from ﬁrm i are given by
Ui (b,Ni) = bNi − pi
17for i = 1,2, where Ni represents the total number of consumers that can be ‘reached’ by subscribing
to ﬁrm i. When the same consumer multihomes, the net utility she gets is
U (b,N) = b − p1 − p2.
In all other respects, the model is the same as in Section 2. To allow the possibility that low types
may want to subscribe to one or more of the ﬁrms, we assume bL > f.
To consider the cases with and without multihoming (but with compatibility absent) we need
to characterize the rational expectations demands for any given prices p1 and p2. These are
conﬁgurations of demand for which if consumers believe they hold, their choice of which ﬁrm(s) to
subscribe to will be consistent with these beliefs. We rule out any prices that are less than f (in
which case a ﬁrm makes a loss if it actually sells anything) or greater than bH (in which case no
consumer would ever subscribe). These represent (weakly) dominated strategies for the ﬁrms.
s1 s2 n1 n2 Associated feasible price range
1 1 0 1 0 f ≤ p1 ≤ bL, f ≤ p2 ≤ bH
2 1 0 0 0 max(f,λbL) ≤ p1 ≤ λbH, f ≤ p2 ≤ bH



















2 0 0 p1 = p2 = λbH
2
5 0 0 0 0 f ≤ p1 ≤ bH, f ≤ p2 ≤ bH
6 0 1 0 0 f ≤ p1 ≤ bH, max(f,λbL) ≤ p2 ≤ λbH
7 0 1 0 1 f ≤ p1 ≤ bH, f ≤ p2 ≤ bL
Table 1: The rational expectations demand conﬁgurations with pure network eﬀects
There are twenty-ﬁve potential demand conﬁgurations that can arise. For high types, we
consider the possibility they all subscribe to ﬁrm 1, all subscribe to ﬁrm 2, all randomize between
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, all multihome, or all do not subscribe to either ﬁrm. For each of these ﬁve
diﬀerent possibilities, there are ﬁve equivalent possibilities for low types. Many of the potential
demand conﬁgurations are not consistent with rational expectations.11 Eliminating these, the
remaining seven rational expectations conﬁgurations in terms of the number of high types and low
types joining each ﬁrm are given in table 1. Each ﬁrm i, then, sets price pi (simultaneously) to
maximize its proﬁt, where proﬁts are
πi = (pi − f)(λsi + (1 − λ)ni).
11For instance, we can rule out a number of conﬁgurations from the fact p1 ≥ f and p2 ≥ f. For a number of
other cases, the constraints on prices for high types imply a contradiction with the constraints on prices for low
types. Without any instrinsic beneﬁts of the services, we also use the fact that consumers must be no worse oﬀ
consuming the service they are assumed to consume, rather than consuming from neither ﬁrm which gives them
zero utility.
18We consider two scenarios concerning beliefs, and in each case compare the private and social
incentives for compatibility, with and without the possibility of multihoming.
4.1 Asymmetric beliefs
Suppose ﬁrm 1 is the incumbent and ﬁrm 2 is the entrant, so that beliefs stubbornly favor ﬁrm 1 —
where there are multiple rational expectations demands, all consumers coordinate on the equilibria
which gives the least demand to ﬁrm 2 (and greatest demand to ﬁrm 1). Given such asymmetric
beliefs, demand conﬁguration 5 rules out the possibility of conﬁgurations 6 or 7. Likewise, we can
rule out conﬁguration 3 using conﬁguration 1, and conﬁguration 4 using conﬁguration 2. There
are then two cases to consider.
1. Case 1. λbH > (bL − (1 − λ)f)/λ. Given that bL > f this also implies λbH > bL. Firm 1’s
demand is determined by conﬁguration 1 if it sets p1 ≤ bL, by conﬁguration 2 if bL < p1 ≤
λbH, and by conﬁguration 5 if p1 > λbH. Facing this demand, ﬁrm 1 will set p1 = λbH to
obtain maximum proﬁts of λ(λbH − f). Firm 2 can set any price in [f,bH].
2. Case 2. λbH ≤ (bL − (1 − λ)f)/λ. Firm 1’s demand is determined by conﬁguration 1 if it
sets p1 ≤ bL. It will set p1 = bL to obtain maximum proﬁts of bL − f. If it sets any higher
price it will either face no demand and earn zero proﬁts, or face a demand only from the high
types, in which case it will set p1 = λbH and obtain lower proﬁts. Firm 2 can set any price
in [f,bH].
With compatibility imposed, ﬁrms compete in a normal Bertrand fashion, driving prices down
to cost. Both ﬁrms make zero proﬁts, and in fact incur a loss once the ﬁxed costs of compatibility
are taken into account.12
As a result of these ﬁndings, both ﬁrms will wish to avoid compatibility (especially ﬁrm 1).
In contrast, consumers will be better oﬀ with compatibility due to the lower prices that result
(f instead of λbH in case 1 or bL in case 2), and due to the greater network beneﬁts under com-
patibility in case 1 (without compatibility, the networks exclude low value consumers altogether).
Provided suﬃcient weight is put on consumer surplus relative to proﬁts, the social planner will
prefer compatibility despite the additional costs of reaching compatibility.
None of the above outcomes depend on whether consumers are able to multihome or not. With
asymmetric beliefs, consumers will anyway coordinate on a single ﬁrm. The fact that consumers
can multihome will not change the possibility that it is desirable to impose compatibility in this
setting. Since asymmetric beliefs imply one ﬁrm takes the whole market (and earns a positive
proﬁt), this ﬁrm will not want to make its network compatible with a rival ﬁrm (even for trivial
costs of compatibility).
12To avoid such a loss, if compatibility was imposed on ﬁrms, some outside source would have to fund the ﬁxed
costs of reaching compatibility.
194.2 Beliefs that give rise to multihoming
Suppose instead beliefs are such that multihoming arises in equilibrium (one such set of rational
beliefs is described below). In this case, prices and proﬁts cannot be lower than under compatibility,
since under compatibility ﬁrms price at cost and earn zero proﬁts (at best). Where multihoming
arises in equilibrium, ﬁrms price at or above cost (conﬁguration 3), and avoid any ﬁxed costs
of reaching compatibility. Firms therefore have no incentive to make their networks compatible.
However, when the ﬁxed costs of reaching compatibility are suﬃciently small, welfare will be
lower under multihoming compared to the case with compatibility. Compared to the case where
all consumers subscribe to one ﬁrm, multihoming involves duplicated costs with no additional
network beneﬁts.
Rational beliefs which support multihoming are as follows. Consumers coordinate on the low
price ﬁrm where multiple conﬁgurations arise. If both ﬁrms set the same price, consumers are
assumed to coordinate on a symmetric conﬁguration (where one exists in which consumers all
subscribe to at least one of the ﬁrms). Otherwise, all consumers coordinate on one of the ﬁrms.
The consequences of such beliefs is that each ﬁrm will want to undercut the rival ﬁrm’s price
provided its price remains above cost. For instance, if ﬁrm 2 sets a price above f, ﬁrm 1 will
undercut its price and conﬁguration 1 will apply. Firm 1 will then sell to all consumers and obtain
a proﬁt of p1 − f.
When multihoming is not allowed, the only equilibria involves p1 = p2 = f, with either all
consumers subscribing to ﬁrm 1 or all consumers subscribing to ﬁrm 2. This is the ﬁrst-best
outcome. In either case, the ﬁrms make zero proﬁts. Given the costs of achieving compatibility,
ﬁrms will have no incentive to become compatible, and compatibility will never be socially desirable.
When multihoming is allowed, provided f < (1 − λ)bL/2 or f > min((1 + λ)bL/2,(1 − λ)bH/2),
prices will still be driven down to costs and all consumers will subscribe to one of the ﬁrms. As
in the case without multihoming, ﬁrms will earn zero proﬁt and the possibility of multihoming
does not change the analysis of compatibility. On the other hand, for intermediate costs, so that
(1 − λ)bL/2 ≤ f ≤ min((1 + λ)bL/2,(1 − λ)bH/2), even though both ﬁrms’ prices will be driven
down to f, all high types will multihome and all low types will randomize over their choice of ﬁrm.
Although the ﬁrms will have no incentive to become compatible, compatibility can be desirable
in this case if the additional costs f incurred by consumers that multihome exceed the additional
ﬁxed costs of making ﬁrms compatible F. As in the case with diﬀerentiated ﬁrms, multihoming
makes it possible that requiring compatibility is desirable where otherwise it would not be.
5 Conclusions
The point of this paper is not to argue that where consumers can (and do) multihome, that such
networks should be forced to become compatible. Rather, the point of this paper is to illustrate
that multihoming does not necessarily solve the “compatibility problem,” in which ﬁrms may
20have too little private incentive to make their networks compatible. Just because some consumers
achieve network beneﬁts by subscribing to multiple networks, does not mean that policymakers
can automatically ignore any concerns they would otherwise have about a lack of compatibility
of networks. In the cases we looked at, the ability of consumers to multihome only made the
“compatibility problem” more likely to arise, not less.
Our ﬁndings have implications for a wide range of industries including various communication
services13, matching services, and diﬀerent hardware/software standards. Take the example of
payment schemes, such as American Express, MasterCard and Visa. Many consumers now hold
multiple such cards, and many merchants accept more than one card. Such multihoming might
suggest that from a social point of view there is no reason to consider the case for forcing these
networks to make their networks compatible. However, multihoming can be costly, both directly
in terms of duplicated costs, but also indirectly because it can weaken competition between the
platforms providing these services, making them less likely to prefer compatibility when it would
otherwise be desirable. Thus, asking whether such networks should be made compatible is an
interesting question even in the presence of widespread multihoming.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
In order to show that the candidate equilibrium prices given in (2) indeed constitute a Nash
equilibrium, we ﬁrst need to characterize the rational expectations demands faced by both ﬁrms.
Then, using these demand functions, we ﬁnd restrictions on parameters which rule out deviations
(also non inﬁnitesimal) of each ﬁrm from the prices in (2).
Recall that the utility of a consumer located at x from ﬁrm i is given by
Ui(x,b,Ni) = v0 − pi − Ti (x) + bNi
while utility from multihoming is
U(x,b,N) = v0 − p1 − p2 − t + b = U12(b).
where Ti(x) = tx(2 − i) + t(1 − x)(i − 1), N1 = λs1 + (1 − λ)n1 and N2 = λs2 + (1 − λ)n2.
Let us ﬁrst establish that low types never prefer to multihome as long as t > bL which is a
consequence of our maintained assumption t > β. We ﬁrst compute the location of the indiﬀerent
low type consumer conditional on s1 and s2. That is, we solve for ˆ n1 such that U1(ˆ n1,bL,N1) =







bLλ (s1 − s2)





t − bL + bLλ
.
A low type consumer located at ˆ n1 will prefer to siglehome if and only if U1(ˆ n1,bL,N1) > U12(bL).
It is easy to verify that




t − (1 − λ)bL + λbL(s1 + s2) + p1 + p2

,
which is positive whenever t > β > (1 − λ)bL irrespective of the market shares in the high types
segment and prices as long as they are nonnegative. Hence when we derive the demand functions
below, we assume that low types always siglehome.
We deﬁne several variables below to facilitate computation.
1. c1 = t − (1 − λ)bL
2. c2 = t − λbH − (1 − λ)bL
3. c3 = 2t(t − (1 − λ)bL) − λ(1 − λ) bLbH
4. c4 = t − bL
5. c5 = (1 − λ)bH
The assumption in (1) that c2 > 0 implies these expressions are all positive.
22We consider rational expectations demands such that given prices, consumers have beliefs about
network sizes which lead them to make subscription decisions that justify these beliefs. There are
several cases to consider in terms of ﬁxing particular expectations on network sizes. We will derive
only the demand for ﬁrm 1 since the demand for ﬁrm 2 is given by symmetry. Taking p2 as given,
we vary p1 to trace out the relevant demand curves.
Case 1. s1 = 1, s2 = 1, n1 = n11, n2 = 1 − n1, 0 < n11 < 1
This is the case in the main text where the high types all multihome. Solving U1(n11,bL,N1) =








Case 2. s2 = s22, s1 = 1, 0 < s22 < 1, n1 = n12, n2 = 1 − n1, 0 < n12 < 1
In this case ﬁrm 1 sells to all high types, while ﬁrm 2 sells to some of each. Solving U1(1 −

















c3 (p1 − p2)
c3
.
Case 3. s1 = s13, s2 = 1, 0 < s13 < 1, n1 = n13, n2 = 1 − n1, 0 < n13 < 1
This is where ﬁrm 2 sells to all high types, while ﬁrm 1 sells to some of each. The solution of

















c5 (p2 − p1)
c3
.
Case 4. s2 = 0, s1 = 1, n1 = n14, n2 = 1 − n1, 0 < n14 < 1
This is where ﬁrm 1 sells to all high types, while ﬁrm 2 sells to no high types but some low













Naturally, these demand curves are valid only for some prices, and the rational expectations
demands switch as we change prices. There are a number of cutoﬀ values of prices which play an
important role in the following. The ﬁrst set of cutoﬀ values are important values of p1, where a
shift in the demand curve occurs and are functions of p2. Cutoﬀs which involve p2:
d1 = λbL + p2 − c1 p1 > d1 ⇒ n14 < 1
d2 =
 
p2 (2c1 + c5) − c5c4

/c5 p1 > d2 ⇒ s22 > 0
d3 = d2 + c3/c5 p1 < d3 ⇒ s22 < 1
d4 =
 






p1 > d4 ⇒ s13 < 1
d5 =
 






p1 < d5 ⇒ s13 > 0
23First notice that d3 > d2 > d1, and d5 > d4 as long as p2 > 0. In the paper, we concentrate on
an equilibrium where s1 = 1 and s2 = 1, that is all high types multihome. This is only possible
whenever d4 > d3. However, whether this inequality holds or not depends on the value of p2. Let
e1 = (1 − λ)bH/2 − t,
then it is easy to verify that d4 > d3 if and only if p2 < e1.
Notice that for p1 < d4, the high type consumer located at 1 is best oﬀ with multihoming,
while this is the case for the consumer located at 0 whenever p1 > d3. Thus, as long as p2 < e1
and d3 < p1 < d4, all high types prefer multihoming to siglehoming.
Now we can write down the demand function for ﬁrm 1 whenever 0 < p2 < e1; that is, whenever
multihoming of the type we are concerned is possible. Table 2 presents the ranges of prices where
a particular set of demands are valid.
Table 2: Rational expectations demands of ﬁrm 1 when 0 < p2 < e1.
0 < p2 < e1
0 < p1 < d1 s1 = 1,s2 = 0,n1 = 1
d1 < p1 < d2 s1 = 1,s2 = 0,n1 = n14
d2 < p1 < d3 s1 = 1,s2 = s22,n1 = n12
d3 < p1 < d4 s1 = 1,s2 = 1,n1 = n11
d4 < p1 < d5 s1 = s13,s2 = 1,n1 = n13
p1 > d5 s1 = 0,s2 = 1,n1 = 0
Recall that the demand conﬁgurations we are interested in involve all high types multihoming
while low types subscribe to one of the two ﬁrms. Table 2 implies that for this conﬁguration to be










4) be simply deﬁned as (d3,d4) evaluated at p∗
2. The best response of ﬁrm 1 to the price
p∗
2 is to match this price if ﬁrm 1 considers prices such that d∗
3 < p1 < d∗
4. However, we need to
also consider the possibility the best response occurs when p1 < d∗
3 or p1 > d∗
4.
Let us ﬁrst look at the prices such that p1 > d∗
4. In this case, ﬁrm 1 will face s1 = s13 and
n1 = n13, and its proﬁt will be given by
π13 = (p1 − f)(λs13 + (1 − λ)n13),







(λc5 + (1 − λ)t)(c4 + p2)





13 is p13 evaluated at p∗
2, and given that π13 is continuous at d4, ﬁrm 1 will
have no proﬁtable deviations whenever p1 > d∗
4. After substituting in all the variables, it is easy




(bH (λc1 + λc5 + t) − c3)((1 − λ)c4 + (1 + λ)c1)
(1 − λ)c3 + 2c1 (λc1 + λc5 + t)
−
2(λc1 + λc5 + t)c3
(1 − λ)c3 + 2c1 (λc1 + λc5 + t)
≡ x1.
If x1 > x0, we obtain the desired result. Evaluating this diﬀerence yields
x1 − x0 =
1
2
(1 + λ)λ (t + c1)(2c1 + c5)
2
(1 − λ)((1 − λ)c3 + 2c1 (λc1 + λc5 + t))
> 0.
Therefore, there is no proﬁtable deviation of ﬁrm 1 where p1 > d∗
4.
Similarly, a condition for the candidate equilibrium prices to constitute an equilibrium is that
there is no proﬁtable deviation such that p1 < d∗
3. In this case, the relevant rational expectations
demand is such that s1 = 1, s2 = s22 and n1 = n12. The proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1 is given by
π12 = (p1 − f)(λ + (1 − λ)n12),



















The ﬁrst condition to check is whether p∗
12 − d∗
3 > 0 where p∗














which is positive whenever
f < bH − t −
(1 + λ)c1 (4tc1 + (2t − λbL)c5)
(4tc1 − λbLc5)(1 − λ)
≡ x2.
Unfortunately, x0 > x2, since




2 (1 + λ)
(4tc1 − λbLc5)(1 − λ)
> 0.
Thus, there are costs f where multihoming of all the high types arises but where ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts
are maximized in a region where this is not a rational expectations demand. To rule out such
deviations we need the maximum deviation proﬁt to be less than that of the proﬁt that may be
obtained in the candidate equilibrium; that is, π∗
M ≥ π12(p∗
12,p∗

























the two values of f which satisfy π∗
M = π12(p∗
12,p∗
2). Computing both roots yield one negative and
one positive root. The relevant root is
x3 =
√
2tc3c1 (1 + λ)
λbL (1 − λ)
−
(1 + λ)(2t + λbL)c1
λbL (1 − λ)
+ bH − t.




2tc3c1 (1 + λ)




(1 + λ)(2t + λbL)c1
λbL (1 − λ)
+ bH − t.
We can now show that x3 > x2, since x3 − x2 = x1
3 + x2
3 − x2 = x1
3 − (x2 − x2
3) > 0 if and only
if (x1
3)2 − (x2 − x2
3)2 > 0 and
(x1
3)2 − (x2 − x2
3)2 =
2tb2




Similarly, x0 > x3, since x0 − x1
3 − x2
3 = (x0 − x2
3) − x1











Thus, we have x2 < x3 < x0. As long as f < x2 < x3, proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is increasing at
p1 = d∗
3, and the candidate equilibrium delivers a higher payoﬀ than deviating to p1 = d∗
3. When,
x2 < f < x3, even though the proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1 has a local maximum, for p1 < d∗
3, this
delivers a lower payoﬀ than the candidate equilibrium. Therefore, as long as f < x3 ≡ f0, ﬁrm
1 has no incentive to deviate to a lower price such that p1 < d∗
3, and our candidate equilibrium
prices given in (2) constitute a Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations.
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